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One of the greatest threats to the maintenance and up-keep of our countries naval
installations is that of hurricanes. Each year throughout the summer and autumn months,
coastlines are prey to nature's fury in the form of these storms which originate and build
their strength in the ocean only to unleash their incredible power on the facilities and living
creatures which inhabit the waterfront, and in some cases, much further inland. The
devastation caused by past major hurricanes has been catastrophic, resulting in billions of
dollars in lost property as well as human life. Each time that a major hurricane occurs,
communities are forced to rebuild their homes, businesses, schools, churches, and all of
the other facilities that are taken for granted by most people. On each of these occasions,
the effected residents and local Governments rebuild in accordance with building codes
that may not have been in effect when the damaged or destroyed structures were originally
built. In many cases, the damage incurred during the storm could have been avoided if the
buildings in question had been retrofitted with equipment specifically designed to enable
buildings to withstand hurricanes.
Although one might initially think that it would be wise to retrofit any coastal
structure with hurricane protection, in some instances, it is not practical to do so.
Depending upon the circumstances, a private citizen may not be able to afford costly
retrofitting costs or may feel that hurricane insurance is more cost-effective. Each citizen,
business, or local Government must consider a number of factors when determining if
protective measures should be implemented. These factors include the value and
condition of the present structure, life expectancy, retrofit costs, insurance coverage, the
cost of an entirely new facility, and the associated costs of temporary lodging, temporary




In the case of the Navy bases, most of which are located in coastal areas, the Navy
incurs all of the costs of damage and the related expenses associated with temporary
relocations and shutdowns. Since Navy bases provide housing facilities for many military
families, a highly destructive hurricane would leave many servicepersons and their families
homeless or living under unsatisfactory conditions for an extended period of time These
conditions drastically reduce an installation's readiness and ability to perform its intended
mission as well as the missions of the numerous Navy ships, aircraft squadrons, and other
tenant commands which call a particular installation home. Of course, any Navy base
which incurs severe damage to housing facilities will obviously suffer more severe
destruction to other higher value structures. These circumstances cannot be ignored and
would not be overcome easily, but if the individual serviceperson's home and family life
remain fairly well intact, that serviceperson will be more effective in his or her duties in
getting the base back on its feet.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RECENT MAJOR HURRICANES
Overview
This report will study the need, practicality, and feasibility of retrofitting Navy
housing facilities to provide greater protection against hurricanes. In order to make a
thorough study of this topic, it is necessary to study recent hurricanes and their effects on
coastal housing facilities of various structural types. The hurricanes that will be discussed
include the following: Hurricane Camille which struck the Mississippi and Louisiana Gulf
Coast in 1969 and remains the most powerful storm to strike United States soil, Hurricane
Hugo which caused extensive damage in the Caribbean and the Carolina coastline in 1989;
Hurricane Andrew which nearly destroyed Homestead Air Force Base in 1992 and was the
most costly hurricane in U.S. history in terms of monetary damage caused in south Florida
and Louisiana, and Hurricanes Erin and Opal which both struck the Pensacola area in
Florida's panhandle during the highly active hurricane season of 1995.
Hurricane Camille
In terms of intensity and relative cost of damage at the time, Hurricane Camille
was probably the most catastrophic hurricane in U. S. history. The storm has had a lasting
effect on the gulf coast of Mississippi and Louisiana where there are still constant
reminders of Camille' s impact. Camille is the only hurricane to hit the U.S. mainland as a
Category V storm, though another storm struck the Florida Keys around Labor Day 1935,
before the storms received names, with even greater intensity than Camille Hurricanes
are categorized according to the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale as follows:

Category Winds (mph) Storm Surge (feet) Damage Characteristics
I 74-95 4-5 Minimal
II 96-110 6-8 Moderate
III 111-130 9-12 Extensive
IV 131-154 13-18 Extreme
V >155 18 Catastrophic
Camille reached tropical storm status on the morning of Thursday, August 14,
1969 when it was located slightly less than 500 miles south of Miami It grew in intensity
quickly and was categorized as a hurricane the next morning. As Camille moved toward
the southwest coast of Cuba that afternoon, it was evident that it would be a major
hurricane, with maximum winds of 1 15 mph extending out 125 to 150 miles to the north
of the center and 50 miles to the south. After racking the western portion of Cuba on
Friday evening, Camille headed for the Gulf of Mexico where it was expected to intensify.
With the hurricane located 420 miles south of Panama City, Florida on early
Saturday morning, a hurricane watch was ordered for the Gulf coast from Biloxi,
Mississippi to St. Marks, Florida. At the time Camille was traveling north-northwest at
approximately 10 mph and was expected to continue on a northerly path. As weather
forecasters followed the storm throughout that day, the watch was upgraded to a warning,
calling Camille a "very intense and dangerous storm. " By Sunday morning, Camille had
shifted to the west, now posing the greatest threat to the coastlines of Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama. At 3 o'clock that afternoon, Camille's eye, unusually compact
and dangerous, was located 120 miles southeast ofNew Orleans, with winds estimated at
nearly 200 mph near the center of the storm. The outer edges of the hurricane were
expected to move inland at Gulfport, Mississippi by early Sunday night.

By 7 o'clock that evening, the eye of Camille was 60 miles south of Gulfport, and
4wT western quadrants were raking southeastern Louisiana. Estimated wind velocities of
140 to 160 mph were reported at Garden Island Bay and Pillottown, while tide levels were
measured at up to 16 feet above sea level. At 9 o'clock, the storm was 35 miles south of
Gulfport. The eye of the storm, once again much smaller and more intense than most
hurricanes, went inland just east of Gulfport at Waveland and Bay St. Louis. Much of the
weather measuring equipment in Mississippi was destroyed, but some individuals who
braved the storm estimated the winds at 160 mph. A reliable high-water of 22 6 feet was
found, but other less reliable marks measured over 24 feet.
Camille lost its intensity quickly after hitting land, reaching tropical depression
status before crossing the northern border of Mississippi. However, Camille brought
heavy rains to Tennessee, Kentucky, and the southern portion of West Virginia over the
next two days as it headed east toward Virginia and the Atlantic Ocean. The storm
appeared to have spent all of its strength when it suddenly intensified on Tuesday night,
bringing torrential rains, flooding, and mudslides to southeastern West Virginia and
Virginia. Within 8 hours on Wednesday the 20th, Camille dumped 27 inches of rain on
central Virginia. Camille finally reached the Atlantic Ocean and merged with a frontal
system on Friday the 22nd. The storm's disastrous course had finally been run.
The tremendous intensity of Hurricane Camille left tragic scars on the areas which
it pounded. The death toll for Hurricane Camille was 262, including 137 in the coastal
areas of Mississippi and 1 14 in the flooded areas of Virginia. The damages left in
Camille's wake were estimated at $1,420,700,000 with over half of those losses occurring
in Mississippi.
Southern Mississippi residents remain extremely wary of hurricanes and their
destructive nature. More than twenty years after the fury of Camille, residents of the
coastal cities of Gulfport and Biloxi, are tremendously cautious when a storm begins to

build in the Atlantic Having also experienced Hurricane Frederic in 1979, which struck
somewhat further west than Camille, Mississippi residents stress and methodically practice
hurricane preparedness. The local Navy Seabee base in Gulfport and Keesler Air Force
Base in Biloxi hold mandatory training for their servicepersons at the onset of each
hurricane season.
Beyond the death and destruction caused by Camille, which serve as ominous
memorials for the ferocity of a catastrophic Category V hurricane, the rapid nature in
which it developed its tremendous intensity as well as the unpredictable path it traveled
should provide proof of the need for personal preparedness and discipline to heed storm
warnings.
Hurricane Hugo
Hurricane Hugo was the second most destructive hurricane in U. S. history with
approximately $10 billion in damage. A Category IV hurricane, it also was the eleventh
most intense hurricane to strike American soil. Hugo began as a tropical disturbance off
the west African coast on September 9, 1989. The storm gained intensity as it crossed the
Atlantic and reached hurricane status by September 13. On Friday, September 1 5 at 9
PM, the National Weather Service office in San Juan, Puerto Rico issued a hurricane
watch. It was elevated to a hurricane warning at 3:15 PM on the 16th. Prior to striking
Puerto Rico, Hugo bore down on several Caribbean islands including Guadeloupe and
Montserrat, and the U S. Virgin Islands of St. Croix and St. Thomas. Before landfall,
Hugo reached a maximum sustained wind speed of 190 mph, making it a Category V
storm at the time By the time it struck the islands on the 17th, Hugo had reduced in
intensity to a Category IV hurricane On Guadeloupe, approximately half of the capital
city of Pointe-a-Pitre was destroyed, and Montserrat also experienced severe damage. St.
Thomas and St. Croix were also hard hit with St. Croix taking the brunt of Hugo's intense

winds for an unusually long period of time on the night of the 1 7th and the early morning
of Monday the 18th. Hugo then proceeded through Vieques sound and over Puerto Rico
at about 8:30 AM on the 18th The majority of Puerto Rico's damage occurred in San
Juan, which is not surprising since it is by far the largest city of the small island territory
The coastal residents of Puerto Rico were fortunate to be alerted early enough by the
island's Civil Defense Disaster Interagency Committee to evacuate their homes.
By the time Hugo had passed over Puerto Rico, it weakened to a Category II
storm on the Saffir-Simpson scale. A hurricane watch was issued for the Atlantic coast
from St Augustine, Florida to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina on Monday the 18th of
September. On the morning of the 19th, a hurricane warning was issued for roughly the
range of coastline As the storm continued to move northwest to the U.S. mainland, it
once again gained strength over the open ocean. Forecasters predicted that Hugo would
strike mainland soil with Category HI intensity. Wisely, the governor of South Carolina
ordered the evacuation of barrier islands, beaches, and peninsulas on the 19th because the
storm eventually built up to a Category IV hurricane. Luckily, Charleston officials also
ordered the evacuation of that city on the 19th.
Hurricane Hugo made landfall just before midnight on Thursday, September 21,
very near Charleston. Hugo's peak wind gust was recorded as 137 mph just before
landfall at the North Charleston Navy Yard. After landfall, the maximum measured
sustained surface wind was 87 mph, yet it was estimated to have reached 121 mph. Three
hours after landfall, in the areas of Columbia and Sumter, South Carolina, Hugo's wind
speed was below hurricane force, and three more hours later, 200 miles inland at
Charlotte, North Carolina, winds were measured at 54 mph.
Damages in the Caribbean approached $3 billion with St. Croix, St. Thomas, and
the northeastern corner of Puerto Rico suffering the worst. The cities of San Juan,
Fajardo, and Luquillo in Puerto Rico were hit very hard, with Luquillo receiving the most

severe damage. Damage to buildings ranged from superficial to total devastation. As to
be expected, roof damage was most prevalent, and nonstructural elements such as doors
and windows suffered extensive damage. Single story concrete buildings withstood the
storm fairly well, with minimal damage.
The affected islands' infrastructure suffered greatly with electrical distribution lines
being the most hard hit This precipitated other problems, particularly efforts to pump
water out of flooded areas and structures, and transmitting public service broadcasts via
television and radio. Telephone communications were also affected as a result of downed
poles, oftentimes the same poles which hampered the electrical system. In the Virgin
Islands, some areas were without telephone service for nearly six months. Finally, a
number of storm related mishaps severely limited the water supply in the storm damaged
islands.
In North Carolina and South Carolina, the cost of storm related damages was
estimated at $7 billion. As expected, coastal structures received the heaviest damage.
Wind damage was observed along a wide path along the coast and at least 200 miles
inland to Charlotte. Well-built structures along the coastline sustained very little damage,
but foundation failures due to wind were common where structures were elevated on
unreinforced masonry piers. Major structural damage was incurred in areas where the
strongest winds occurred. These damages included the loss of roof structure, collapse of
single-story masonry buildings, complete destruction of mobile homes, and extensive
damage to wood-framed construction and pre-engineered metal buildings. Falling trees
caused the most damage in the inland areas.
The most severely hampered public lifeline resulting from Hugo in the Carolinas
was the loss of electrical power. Between 1 million and 1.5 million citizens were without
power from 2 to 3 weeks. Of course, the loss of power also severely hampered other
important services such as transportation, communication, water, and wastewater
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facilities Some roadways were washed out on the barrier islands and one bridge to the
islands experienced failure, but storm debris in roadways and the destruction of traffic
signs and signals were more prevalent on the mainland. Airport operations were also
impacted, particularly at Charleston where the airport was closed to commercial traffic for
a week. Telephone systems performed well as a result of more than 80 percent of the
telephone lines being underground. Power outages did affect radio and television service
at both the transmitting and receiving ends, and the lack of electricity also made somewhat
of an impact on water and wastewater systems. On the barrier islands, severe beach
erosion destroyed water and sewer lines and exposed septic tanks.
It is estimated that between 4000 and 5000 historic buildings in South Carolina
were damaged by Hugo. These damages were a result of both the strong winds and storm
surge, plus the rains which followed the Hugo's passage. The combination of wind
damaged roofs and the rainwater caused severe water damage to these older structures.
Many chimneys and architectural details were lost, and subtle damage also surfaced in the
form of shear cracks in masonry walls, as well as mechanical damage and fungal damage
to plaster.
Loss of life in the Caribbean totaled 29, including 22 on Puerto Rico. Most of the
deaths were the result of drownings or electrocutions. In the Carolinas, the death toll
reached 27 with seven wind-related deaths and six water/boating fatalities. The other 14
deaths occurred after the storm and were primarily from cleanup accidents and open
flames being used for light
Hurricane Andrew
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 was the costliest hurricane in U.S. history, causing an
estimated $25 billion in damage in the southern Florida peninsula and south-central
Louisiana. In fact, the amount of devastation left in Andrew's wake makes it the most

expensive natural disaster of any kind ever in our country. Hurricane Andrew was the
strongest Category IV storm ever to hit the United States Only Hurricane Camille and
the hurricane which struck the Florida Keys in 1935, both Category V storms, were of
greater intensity Andrew's cost was so great because of the tremendous population and
property values in south Florida. Hurricane Camille does not nearly approach Andrew's
cost because of the smaller population of the affected area as well as 23 years between the
two storms and the effect of inflation on the U.S. dollar during that time
As its name indicates, Andrew was the first tropical storm of the 1992 season,
occurring fairly late in the season. It reached hurricane strength on the morning of August
22, 1992 and approached Category V intensity just 36 hours later. Andrew was a
Category IV storm when its eye passed over northern Eleuthera Island in the Bahamas late
on the 23rd, registering a storm surge of 23 feet in one location. It passed over the
southern islands of the Bahamas very early on the 24th. After weakening during its pass
over the Bahamas, the hurricane rapidly intensified over the next few hours as it headed
for the south Florida coastline.
Andrew struck the Florida coastline in southern Dade County in the early morning
hours of August 24 The maximum sustained wind speed during landfall over Florida was
estimated at 145 mph. The highest measurement of storm surge on the Florida coastline
was 16.9 feet, but it was considerably less in most affected Florida areas, typically in the 4-
7 feet range. Andrew moved nearly due westward over Florida and crossed the southern
peninsula in about four hours, falling to Category III status yet remaining a very strong
hurricane when its eye passed over the Florida southwestern coast and headed into the
Gulf of Mexico. Upon reaching the Gulf, weather conditions caused Andrew to shift to
the northwest, moving at a speed of approximately 8 knots. Still a Category III hurricane,
Andrew struck a sparsely populated area of the south-central Louisiana coast,
approximately 20 miles west-southwest ofMorgan City, in the early morning hours of the
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26th. Andrew weakened quickly after landfall, dropping to tropical storm strength in
about 10 hours and tropical depression strength in just 12 more hours. By the 28th of
August, Andrew began to merge with a frontal system over the mid-Atlantic states.
The damages as a result of Hurricane Andrew are staggering As stated
previously, the total damage estimate was approximately $25 billion with nearly $23
billion occurring in southern Florida. Andrew destroyed more than 25,000 homes in
southern Florida and damaged 100,000 more. Damage to boats in the Dade County area
totaled $500 million. In Louisiana, damage was estimated at $1 billion, and losses in the
Gulf of Mexico to oil industry equipment were estimated to be $500 million. The
Bahamas suffered nearly $250 million in damage. Despite these tremendous losses, the
results could have been much more devastating. Andrew was a very tight and compact
storm so the width of its path was fairly small, especially compared to Hurricane Hugo
Had Andrew been a few miles wider or struck the Florida coastline a few miles to the
north, the cities of Miami, Miami Beach, Fort Lauderdale and other highly populated
communities would have been devastated, and the damage totals would have been
substantially higher than they already were.
The types of damage incurred as a result of Hurricane Andrew in the south Florida
area varied and included the following lifeline related elements: utility centers and
generation plants, above-ground utilities, and transportation facilities. There was
relatively little damage to lifeline facilities such as power plants, water and wastewater
plants, and hospitals. Electrical distribution lines and telephone lines performed poorly
during Andrew, as they did in Hurricane Hugo, but outages were not as widespread or as
lengthy as in Hugo. Many traffic signals malfunctioned as far north as Fort Lauderdale,
and many traffic signs were lost. As a result of these breakdowns in the transportation
systems, National Guardsmen, state, and local employees were called upon to direct traffic
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for a period of a few days Had this not been required, those personnel could have utilized
in more productive recovery efforts.
Damages to conventional residential structures were extensive, mainly due to the
failure of roofing materials, doors, and windows. Homes that were built prior to the up-
to-date codes sustained much heavier damage. These failures resulted in wind and rain
penetration of the structures which caused major interior damage. Damages were even
more extensive when roof sheathing and gable ends collapsed. Overall, the structures
which were constructed according to code requirements performed well.
The loss of roofing materials was the most important and costly aspect of the
residential damage. In addition to the weather penetration which resulted from roofing
losses, the loose shingles and tiles acted as flying debris and had significant effects on
neighboring structures.
As with the loss of roof shingles and tiles, damage to windows and doors allowed
for wind and rain penetration in many homes. The resulting interior damage included
collapsed ceilings and interior non-load bearing walls, and it was so great in many cases
that the homes were deemed uninhabitable.
Roof-sheathing losses and gable end failures were widespread and related to each
other in some cases. The loss of roof sheathing was normally caused by inadequate
nailing. These poor construction practices included nails being too far apart and nails
which missed the truss or rafter beneath the sheathing. A large number of the sheathing
failures occurred near the ridge of gable roofs or along the eaves, where high winds were
likely to have made the greatest impact. Other gable-end failures were determined to be
the result of an inadequate attachment and support of the gable-end roof truss to the top
of the end wall.
Connections in lateral load paths of structures fared fairly well against Hurricane
Andrew. In some cases, exterior wall failure occurred when there was no plywood
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backing against hardboard siding On the whole, careful attention was paid to uplift, but
lack of strength and continuity in the lateral load path was noted in several buildings which
incurred substantial structural damage
The number of deaths attributed directly to Hurricane Andrew was 26 Fifteen
deaths occurred in Florida, 8 in Louisiana, and 3 in the Bahamas An additional 39 deaths
were indirectly attributed to Hurricane Andrew with most of those happening in Florida.
Hurricanes Erin and Opal
Pensacola, Florida and its surrounding area was the most recent geographic
location to suffer the effects of a major hurricane. In fact, the area was impacted by two
hurricanes between early August and early October of 1995. The first hurricane to strike
the western end of the Florida panhandle was Erin, a Category I storm which struck land
on the morning of August 3
.
Erin was a storm which began as an area of disturbed weather over the Bahamas
on July 30. It developed into a tropical storm the following day, and became a Category I
hurricane by early August 1 . Erin struck the Atlantic coast of Florida near Vero Beach in
the very early morning hours of August 2. As Erin crossed the Florida peninsula, it
weakened back to a tropical storm, and then regained Category I strength in the Gulf of
Mexico. Moving west-northwest path, Erin made landfall at Pensacola Beach shortly
before noon on August 3, packing maximum winds of approximately 90 mph. Erin again
weakened quickly, falling all the way to a tropical depression less than a day after
sweeping over Pensacola.
As a Category I storm, Hurricane Erin caused much less damage than the other
hurricanes previously discussed. The wind speeds were relatively low in comparison, but
wind damage was indeed significant. Erin carried a very small storm surge, which had
little effect on the Pensacola area. However, just two months later, Pensacola and other
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nearby communities would suffer tremendous damage as a result of storm surge from the
more powerful Hurricane Opal
In contrast to Hurricane Erin, Opal originated from a tropical wave off the west
coast of Africa, just as most of the more powerful hurricanes. After twelve days of
movement, the wave merged with a low pressure are near the western Caribbean Sea on
September 23 This combined system moved west-northwest toward the Yucatan
peninsula over the next few days with little storm development. On the 27th, a tropical
depression began to form approximately 70 nautical miles south-southeast of Cozumel,
Mexico The storm moved slowly westward over the Yucatan peninsula over the next
three days, strengthening into a tropical storm by the time it crossed over the northern
coast of the Yucatan and into the Bay of Cameche (southwest of the Gulf of Mexico) on
the 30th
By midday on October 2, Opal had acquired hurricane strength and began to turn
to the north. Throughout the next two days, the storm strengthened even further,
accelerated, and turned toward the northeast. By the early morning hours of October 4,
Opal reached Category IV strength with maximum sustained winds estimated at 145 mph.
The hurricane weakened slightly before landfall at Pensacola Beach, making it a Category
III storm by the time it struck at approximately 5 PM local time. After racking the
Pensacola area, Opal weakened very rapidly, becoming a tropical storm over southern
Alabama and a tropical depression over southeastern Tennessee.
There are conflicting reports as to Opal's maximum sustained wind speed in the
Pensacola area, but most sources are certain that they exceeded 100 mph. The winds
actually appeared to have less of an effect than those of Hurricane Erin, which was a
smaller storm, though Opal's winds were distributed over a wider area. Investigators had
a difficult time determining if damage had been caused by Opal or was yet unrepaired from
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Erin. It is safe to say that Erin caused damage that likely would have been incurred as a
result of Opal, had Erin never occurred.
Water from the storm surge was the most significant cause of damage by
Hurricane Opal The water damage was unusually out of proportion to the wind damage.
It is possible that the large ocean movement was set in motion while Opal was at its peak
strength in the Gulf of Mexico, before weakening as it approached land. The maximum
storm surge was difficult to ascertain, but it was estimated to have reached 1 5 feet.
Rains associated with Hurricane Opal were very heavy. The Florida panhandle, as
well as parts of Alabama and Georgia, experienced rainfall ranging from 5 to 10 inches.
States as far north as Maryland also experienced rains as a result of Opal. These rains
were in fact beneficial because of the prolonged dry period in the eastern U.S. just prior to
the storm
As stated before, most of the heavy damage caused by Hurricane Opal was the
result of the heavy storm surge. Beach and sand dune erosion was heavy from Pensacola
Beach to Panama City. U.S. Highway 98 was completely breached east of Fort Walton
Beach, and that area also had severe sand dune erosion. In some places, the sand
appeared to have been deposited almost as if it were drifting snow. In fact, in one case at
Fort Walton Beach, a swimming pool was almost completely filled with sand.
The storm surge caused structural failures of buildings in beach areas, most of
which was attributed to erosion of soil from around and under building foundations.
Properly elevated buildings withstood the storm surge fairly well except in cases where
piles were inadequately imbedded. Buildings that were improperly elevated incurred
substantial damage to wood stud or masonry bearing walls, sometimes resulting in
complete destruction of the buildings. Newer homes, for the most part, performed well




The building envelope (weather integrity of roof coverings, structural integrity of
doors and windows, structural integrity of roof and wall cladding, etc.) of most homes
was the most serious problem caused by Opal's winds Wind damage was apparently less
than that caused by Hurricane Erin except in the most eastern areas affected by the storm.
As discussed earlier, it will remain unclear how much damage was caused by Opal's winds
because of the small amount of time between the two hurricanes
The performance of wind coverings during both Erin and Opal ranged from good
to poor. Roof cladding was not as severe a problem in Opal as it had been in Erin, likely
because most repairs had been made after Erin, and the decking was much better prepared
than before. Regarding exterior wall cladding, damage to vinyl siding systems appeared to
be the most significant. This damage was usually due to the tearing of the siding over nail
heads, although in some cases the siding was cut by flying debris. Damage to brick veneer
occurred in some instances where it was noted the veneer ties were not embedded into the
mortar joints in the veneer. With no anchoring of the brick veneer to the wall, the veneer
could not resist wind loads.
Damage to doors and windows was incurred as a result of Hurricane Opal, but
these problems were not that widespread. When they did occur, the damages were
significant. In some cases, window failures on the windward side of a building would
result in damage or collapse of a leeward wall because of the internal pressure. In other
instances, failures of gable end walls, which are especially susceptible to hurricane force
winds, were the result ofwindow failures in other walls. In some cases the failures of
these windows precipitated the failure of poorly constructed walls themselves. For




Garage doors incurred little damage as a result of Opal's winds, but some near the
waterfront reflected minor damage to lower panels, indicating damage caused by storm
surge
Damage estimates of Hurricanes Erin and Opal are difficult to ascertain due to the
short time between the storms. Though destructive, these hurricanes did not come close
to approaching the level of damage attributed to Camille, Hugo, and Andrew. They do
provide more valuable information that can be utilized to make homes and other buildings




COMMON PREVALENT DAMAGE OF RECENT U.S. HURRICANES
Overview
There are many common types of damage that were incurred during the major
hurricanes that were discussed in the first chapter This chapter will explore the damage in
detail and describe suggested actions to prevent this type of damage in future storms The
damages that will be discussed will focus on one to two story dwelling units of wood-
frame or masonry construction since these are the most common among military housing
structures. The hurricane which provided the majority of information in this chapter was
Andrew, which is predictable since it caused such a large amount of damage. In fact in
1993, shortly after Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida, the Southern Building Code
Congress International altered its Standard For Hurricane Resistant Residential
Construction SSTD 10-93 in an effort to implement new engineering design standards to
withstand heavy winds and possible storm surge. Since this standard did not apply to
most of the homes affected by Hurricanes Erin and Opal, it is difficult art this time to
ascertain the complete effectiveness of the new standards, but in a few cases, the standards
did apply.
Typical Building Structural Systems
Primary structural systems support the building against all lateral and vertical
loads In residential structures, these systems include the exterior loadbearing walls, non-
loadbearing wall panels, roof structure and diaphragm, and foundation. The strength of
the structure depends upon these items as well as the connections between them. In the
structural systems, the all important connections form a "load transfer path." A proper
load transfer path is the most critical element in preventing catastrophic damage from high
18

winds. The roofing system of a residential structure is also critical. Failure of the roof
diaphragm or trusses results in the failure of the building envelope, and in addition to the
likely wind damage that is incurred, the interior of the home is left highly susceptible to
heavy rains which are normally associated with a hurricane.
One- to Two Story Light Wood-Frame Buildings
Catastrophic failure of one-to two story light wood-frame buildings occurs more
frequently than catastrophic failures of residential structures of any other type. Total
building failure is normally the result of negative pressure and/or induced internal pressure
overloading the building envelope. Improper installation as well as the absence of framing
connections, load transfer straps, or bracing from between walls and roof components are
the most prevalent causes of these building failures.
The wood-frame gable ends of roof structures are the most common locations for
failures in these types of buildings. Gable ends require bracing from within the roof
structure for lateral force resistance The gable sections are an essential part of the
integrity of the overall structural system during a storm with heavy winds. In particular,
when properly braced, gable ends act as a stiffener for the roof diaphragm with the
primary stiffening coming from the roof sheathing (typically plywood). In a hurricane, if
the roof sheathing separates from the roof trusses and the gable ends are not braced,
severe structural damage is almost certain to occur.
Other deficiencies to structural members that are typically found after heavy
storms include improper sill-to masonry and sill to concrete foundation connections,
unbraced stud columns, inadequate connections between exterior and interior shear walls,
and faulty spliced wall top-plate systems. These deficiencies alone or in combination with




As stated before, roof framing systems are typically designed and built with light
wood trusses and plywood sheathing. Most of the trusses are prefabricated and perform
well under hurricane wind forces, but the connection of the sheathing to the trusses is
sometimes inadequate. In most cases, the cause of this deficiency is substandard
workmanship by either stapling or improper nailing. In addition, a trend in design and
construction of the past has been to overlook adequate truss bridging, system-wide lateral
bracing, cross-bracing at end trusses, as well as gable end stiffening. These practices leave
a system with total reliance on sheathing for truss-roof bracing, thus inviting disastrous
effects.
Masonry Wall Buildings
The most prevalent cause of failure of masonry buildings is a lack of vertical wall
reinforcing Not surprisingly, concrete block and stucco building systems usually perform
better than all-wood-frame construction, but failures do indeed still occur Conditions
which typically lead to masonry building failure include the following: poor mortar joints
between wall and slab pours; lack of tie-beams, horizontal reinforcing, tie columns, and
tie-anchors; and misplaced or missing hurricane straps between walls and the roof
structure.
Combination Masonry First Floor with Light Wood-Frame Second Floor Buildings
Failure of wood-frame second floor systems normally occurs in a similar manner to
all-wood-frame residences. Structural breakdowns at wood-frame gable ends, poor
connections of wood sill plates to first story masonry walls, inadequate anchoring of sole
plates to masonry are some of the most common causes of structural failures. A shortage
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of bolted anchors, unsecured anchors, and even substituting items such as cut nails for
anchors are some of the possible roots of structural failure between the two stories.
Wood-Frame Modular Build ings
Modular buildings typically perform fairly well in hurricanes. The module-to-
module combination of units provides an inherently rigid system which performs much
better than conventional residential framing. Performance is typically better in both the
transverse and longitudinal directions, however most failures which do occur impact the
end wall units This is normally attributed to poor connections of the tops of the walls to
the roof diaphragms. Loss of roof sheathing to some degree can be expected either due to
building envelope breach or external wind forces and debris. Rafters usually remain intact
due to the system's strong rigidity as a result of short spans and strong connections.
Accessory Structures
Accessory structures such as porch enclosures, carport systems, sheds, and
playground equipment normally do not hold up well in strong hurricanes. These items are
not a major concern themselves, but there is danger in the potential of them becoming
flying debris. By code, these items are designed for only 75 mph wind speeds.
Roof Cladding Systems
Roof cladding is comprised of both underlayment material (e.g. building felt) and
the topmost covering (e.g. tiles and shingles) which are sequentially installed Roof
cladding damage is probably the most likely type of damage that any residential structure
will incur Buildings which escape major structural damage in a Category IV hurricane are
almost certain to receive some roof cladding damage from wind and/or flying debris.
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Damage to roof cladding systems normally results in interior damage from wind-driven
rains entering the building.
Considerable losses are sometimes observed in composition shingles systems.
Substandard workmanship is a considerable contributing factor. This poor work includes
torn shingles and insufficiently attached shingles (i.e. insufficient number of staples or
incorrectly located or oriented staples) In extreme hurricanes of Category IV or greater,
tears or pullouts from proper staple connections are a possibility.
In tile shingle systems, failures occur as a result of both nailing and/or mortar
connections which are critical to the attachment of precast and molded tile systems.
Failures of underlayment, lack of bond between the underlayment and mortar, and lack of
bond between the mortar and tile are also common causes of damage to these cladding
systems. Generally, flat-shaped tiles perform better in heavy winds, and clay tiles are more
susceptible to shattering from the impact of flying debris However, the clay tiles provide
better adhesion to mortar than the concrete tiles. In almost all roofing systems, no matter
how well built a system is designed and constructed, it is still likely to incur some damage
as a result of flying debris form nearby poorly built systems.
Exterior Wall Openings
The breaching of the building envelope by failure of openings such as doors and
windows normally results in significant interior damage and sometimes structural damage
due to internal air pressure. Generally, window protection such as plywood and shutters
perform well, but flying debris can result in window protection failure. Most residents do
not protect or reinforce doors that do not include glazing as part of their make-up, but
failure of solid doors certainly can occur. In addition, structures with adequate roof
ventilation tend to withstand building envelope penetration by the wind because this
ventilation provides relief for the built-up pressure in the building.
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Failure of garage doors is a major contributing cause of building envelope
penetration. Garage doors fail when the heavy winds cause door deflection greater than
the amount allowed in the design This excessive deflection results in deformation of the
entire garage door assembly which will ultimately lead to separation of the door from the
opening. Depending upon the floor plan of the house, this can allow a tremendous buildup
of internal pressure in the home and lead to major interior and structural damage It is
interesting to note that single car garage doors appear to withstand heavy winds much
better than two-car garage doors, likely because of the shorter span.
Regarding entry doors, french doors as well as double doors made from wood and
metal also fail on occasion during hurricanes. Most of the failures pertain to the doors'
center pins. In metal doors, the deflection of the doors results in the pulling out of the
center pins. Most wood doors seem to withstand deflection, but shattering of the door
leafs at the location of the center pin leads to failure.
Window systems, particularly large ones such as sliding glass doors, are highly
susceptible to high wind pressures and flying debris. Normally, glazing failures occur so
readily that window frames are not impacted. Storm shutters and plywood boarding are
invaluable in preventing window penetration and protecting the overall integrity of the
building envelope.
Flood Related Damage
Homes along shore fronts should always expect some degree of water damage as a
result of a severe hurricane. During Hurricane Opal, it was reported that over 3000
structures were destroyed by the storm surge. Damage to homes should be expected to
vary depending upon the home's distance from the shoreline and the type of foundation.
Elevated structures built to new building codes perform well Older structures near the
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beach or with slab on grade construction normally do not fare well, though some masonry
buildings manage to hold up.
For the most part, elevated homes built on properly embedded piles can be
expected to withstand a very strong storm surge. Scouring sometimes has an effect on
elevated piles by moving the sand in which the piles are deeply (usually 10 feet or more)
embedded. Casting a concrete slab at grade between the piles protects the sand below and
limits the effect of scouring.
Channeling and shielding are countering effects which are the result of a heavy
storm surge. In some cases, attached residential buildings serve as shields to buildings
further inland. On the other hand, some arrangements of similar residential structures
cause the storm surge to become concentrated or channeled with higher velocity and
greater height. Channeling normally has a great effect on the end units of structures such
as townhomes. With the increased velocity and height, there is much greater water
pressure at the corners of the structures, sometimes causing dramatic damage to the end
units while the remainder of the building remains well intact. Channeling and shielding are
very unpredictable effects and somewhat infrequent. It is nearly impossible to consider
these effects in the design stage, but effective shielding using properly maintained sand




RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR HURRICANE DAMAGE PREVENTION
Overview
In order to make recommendations to the Navy for the specific bases that were
studied as well as general recommendations for all bases, a thorough review of
recommendations made by experts in this field of study was necessary The following
recommendations are made based upon findings of damage assessments following the
recent hurricanes discussed in Chapter I. Most of the recommendations are based upon
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's report entitled Building Performance:
Hurricane Andrew in Florida
Roof Cladding and Roof Framing Systems
1 Inspect roof bracing and sheathing prior to installation of roof underlayment.
2. Install diagonal braces for top chord of roof trusses at gable ends as well as ridge
braces and horizontal braces along the building length (see Figures IV-A & IV-B).
3 Install additional roof bracing for gable roof overhang (see Figure IV-C).
4 Install composition shingles which are manufactured and rated as satisfactory for high
wind areas. In absence of the satisfactory shingles, use a hot-mopped underlayment or
other water-resistant membrane to provide protection from water infiltration (see Figure
IV-D)
5 Minimum nailing requirements and enforcement thereof for roof sheathing should be
strictly enforced. A sheathing inspection should take place prior to the installation of the
roof covering.
5 Quality control of roof tile installation should be enforced by ensuring consistent
mortar pad placement and installation. In addition, prefabricated eave closure strips
should be used to elevate the butt end of the first, or eave, tile to attain the proper slope
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FIGURE IV-C
ROOF BRACING FOR GABLE ROOF OVERHANG
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COMPOSITION SHINGLE ROOFING SYSTEM
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Once all of the roof tile is laid up completely, traffic should not be allowed on the roof for
72 hours, and no work should be done on the structure for 24 hours in order to allow the
tile to properly set without vibration of the roof framing or sheathing Finally, all flashings
should be sealed to the subroof for water tightness.
6. The design of more aerodynamic building shapes is highly recommended. In particular
hip roof systems are much less susceptible to damage from direct perpendicular wind as
well as swirling wind flows which accumulate at corners and edges of building With the
poor performance of gable end roofs and the required bracing that accompanies them to
prevent severe wind damage, an inherently braced hip roof makes much more sense (see
Figure IV-E).
7 Venting with adequate openings should be provided to relieve internal pressures on





Double car garage doors should be avoided in design or held secure during a storm.
Installation of 2" x 4 M girts and metal mullions on two-car garage doors also are valuable
in providing proper stabilization of the wide spans (See Figure IV-F, IV-G, IV-H). In
addition, gliding tracks and track supports should be strengthened to prevent failure
caused by door deflection (See Figure IV-I).
2. Window design should allow for protection from shutters or precut plywood (See
Figures IV-J & IV-K).
3 Exterior doors, particularly double doors, should be built to withstand the design wind
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GARAGE DOOR FAILURE & RETROFIT
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Designers and plan reviewers should take greater care regarding lateral load transfer
mechanisms because of the high lateral loads generated by hurricane winds (See Figures
IV-L & IV-M).
2. During construction, much greater attention should be paid to the proper installation of
all lateral load transfer mechanisms inherent in conventional building framing Workers





Code requirements for tie beam/tie column construction should be more strictly
enforced. Reinforced concrete tie-beams should be placed in all walls of unit masonry, at
each floor or roof level. Tie-columns at all corners and at all intervals of 20 feet should be
considered as a Code improvement. The maximum area of wall panel between structural
members (tie-beams and tie-columns) framing the panel should not exceed 256 feet. (See
Figure IV-P).
2. Continuous tie-beams in masonry walls should be designed and constructed to support
the specific architecture of the structure (See Figure IV-Q). Bracing with struts or pilaster
columns in walls perpendicular to the freestanding walls, or sufficient reinforcing in the
walls anchored in the foundation or story below, also must be engineered and installed.
3. Much greater attention must be paid to the transfer of loads to slabs and masonry walls
from wood framing (See Figure IV-R). Bolted masonry-to-wood connections must be
used in all cases, and shortcut practices such as cut nails must be eliminated. Finally,
masonry to wood straps must be properly located.
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required for longer buildings
External lateral wind forces act on windward wails and roof (W^ and in suction on leeward walls and
roof (W;). End shear walls and interior shear walls permit transfer of these forces to base of building
[W3). Base shear forces (W4 ) transfer into foundation system. Ground resists final transfer of lateral
forces (W 5 ). (Total W,
XWi
FIGURE IV-L




PRIMARY WOOD FRAMING SYSTEMS
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reinforcing between block courses; vertical spacing
determined by engineering analysis
Reinforced concrete tie-beam:
Tie-beam shall have a width of not less than a nominal 8 inches, shall have a
height of not less than 12 inches, and shall be reinforced with not less than four
#5 reinforcing bars placed two at the top and two at the bottom of the beam
Tie-beam shall be provided with hurricane anchors at each truss
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FIGURE IV - Q
STRUCTURAL SUPPORT FOR ARCHITECTURAL SYSTEM
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1 Strengthening the end walls of modular type homes should be considered. This is
especially important in those structures which have gable end walls. Earlier
recommendations regarding roof systems, especially those referring to diagonal and
horizontal bracing, are particularly applicable in modular building end walls.
Accessory Structures
1 Accessory structures should be designed, manufactured, and installed to withstand
winds greater than the 75 mph currently required for such items as porch framing,




SUMMARY OF SBCCI STANDARD FOR HURRICANE RESISTANT
RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION, SSTD 10-93
Overview
In an effort to understand the required engineering aspects of hurricane
preparedness for residential structures, it is helpful to be familiar with the applicable
building code which currently applies to the southern United States, where hurricanes are
most prevalent. SSTD 10-93 is the Southern Building Code Congress International
(SBCCI) standard which sets prescriptive methods for wind resistant designs and
construction details for one- and two-story residential buildings of conventional, wood-
framed and masonry construction in potentially high wind areas The requirements are
deemed to comply with load provisions of Section 1205 of the 1991 edition with the
1992/93 revisions of the Standard Building Code (SBC).
SSTD 10-93 is divided into four chapters: 1 - General Requirements; 2 - Buildings
with Masonry Exterior Walls; 3 - Buildings with Wood-Framed Exterior Walls, and 4 -
Combined Wood and Masonry Exterior Wall Construction. The following summary will
encompass all four chapters but will focus on the items which apply to the prevalent
damage found in major hurricanes which was detailed in Chapter III of this report.
Chapter 1 General Requirements
This chapter outlines various considerations in building design as they pertain to
hurricane preparedness There are sections pertaining to the integrity of the building
envelope as well as building geometry, foundations, and classification of wind loads.
Geometric limits are set for building widths depending upon the number of stories as well
as roof slopes, eaves heights, and several other important measurements. The standard
applies to buildings with slab-on-grade, pile, and concrete footing foundations, and it
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specifically addresses residential structures that fall within Coastal High Hazard Areas and
Special Flood Hazard Areas.
Regarding wind loads, the Code prescribes requirements based upon the Standard
Building Code for buildings less than 60 feet in height. The winds loads are separated into
the overall forces used in the design of Main Wind Resisting Systems (MWFRS) and loads
appropriate for the design of fasteners, cladding, and other small areas of potentially high
loads. These loads are known as Component and Cladding (C&C) loads. The Code
provides prescriptive requirements for buildings sited in three separate wind climates (90,
100, and 1 10 mph) as shown on the map in Figure V-A.
Chapter 2 - Buildings with Masonry Exterior Walls
This chapter prescribes construction requirements for buildings where all exterior
walls above the foundation are masonry and where the building meets the requirements of
Chapter 1
.
Interior walls may be masonry, wood framed, or any other approved
construction.
The chapter initially prescribes the standards for masonry units: composition, size,
reinforcing steel, and accessories. It also discusses the requirements for mortar and grout
used in conjunction with masonry installation.
One of the most important aspects of this chapter is the section dealing with
fasteners and connectors. It prescribes a continuous load path between foundations, walls,
and roofs, and it requires approved anchors, connectors, and other fastening devices able
to withstand forces in the Standard Building Code. This section also prescribes
requirements for reinforcing steel within the masonry, cleanout openings, and grouting.
A section is devoted to the proper design and construction of floorings and
foundations Under design, the Code requires all exterior walls, bearing walls, and
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loads imposed Regarding construction, the Code details specific requirements for items
such as the depth of footings, width of footings, reinforcing steel, and thickness of
stemwalls This section also defines the requirements for concrete slab-on-grade design
and construction, suspended slabs, and wood frame floor systems. For wood frame floors,
specific requirements for joists, trusses, sheathing framing, blocking, fastening, and
connections are detailed. This section also sets standards for suspended floors to resist
lateral forces applied to exterior walls since the floors act as structural diaphragms.
The section on masonry delineates requirements for thickness (generally, 8 inches)
as well as those for bond beams. It also breaks down vertical reinforcement requirements
for wall systems according to which wind zone the structure is sited. For continuous
masonry with gable end walls, the standard is for the masonry to run to the full height of
the roof line with a bond beam at the top of the masonry. Finally, lintel and bond beam
requirements above wall openings such as doors and windows are discussed and outlined
in detail.
There is a requirement for a ceiling diaphragm when a gable endwall of masonry is
not constructed to full height. In the case of no ceiling diaphragm such as a cathedral
ceiling, continuous masonry must be installed to the roof line. No ceiling diaphragm is
required with a hip roof Ceiling frames are also discussed in this section as well as the
use of gypsum wallboard and plywood as diaphragm materials.
A section describes rafter-joist framing systems including materials, spacing, ridge
boards, and collar beams. Truss systems are also discussed including conformity with the
TPI Design Specification for Metal Plate Wood Trusses. Roof sheathing is covered in
detail with specific requirements for 8d common or 8d hot dipped galvanized box nails at
6 inches on center at edges and 6 inches on center at intermediate framing with some
exceptions Specific bracing for roof sheathing is called for when a gable endwall extends
from the floor to the roof sheathing without support from a ceiling diaphragm. There are
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also standards for roof diaphragm shear capacity at sidewall, endwalls, and interior
shearwalls, depending upon factors such as building width as well as the appropriate wind
zone. Connections for wood roof systems to sidewalls are discussed in great detail with
specific requirements for attachment to bond beams as well as bolted top plates (See
Figure V-B & V-C). Different standards for gable endwalls are presented as well as hip
roofs. Interior shearwall connections to the roof are required to meet the same
requirements as endwalls.
Chapter 3 - Buildings with Wood-Framed Exterior Walls
This chapter prescribes construction requirements for buildings where all exterior
walls above the foundation are wood framed. This type of construction is found at one of
the three Navy bases studied in later chapters of this report
The chapter contains sections on fasteners and connectors, as well as footings and
foundations, which are very similar to the requirements in Chapter 2. There is also a
detailed discussion with diagrams regarding stemwall foundations, including restrictions
on footings, masonry foundation walls, floor and wall anchorage.
Another section discusses monolithic slab on grade foundations including wall
anchorage for different wind zones, holddown connectors, and interior footings. Wood
pile restrictions pertaining to uplift and shear loads on piles and girders are also detailed as
well as pile connections.
Floor systems, including concrete floors and wood floors are discussed in the next
section. Thickness and reinforcement requirements for concrete floors are established.
Wood floors are discussed in great detail including descriptions and restrictions for floor
joists, trusses, sheathing, framing, and connections. A table shows required floor
diaphragm shear capacities depending upon wind zones and distance between shear walls,
and another table displays the shear capacities for common diaphragm materials depending
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Requirements for wood-framed wall systems are described in great detail in the
next section. The minimum bending strength is the important consideration for wall studs,
and tables display allowable values for various types and grades of lumbers, and required
values for studs depending upon wind zone plus stud size, length, and spacing.
Connections for exterior wall framing are discussed including uplift connectors providing
continuous resistance from roof to foundation. Tables show the allowable uplift loads for
sidewalls depending upon wind zone, building width, plus roof and ceiling load There is a
separate table for gable endwalls with much lower allowable uplift loads. Figures V-D,
V-E, V-F, and V-G show typical wall connections to roof systems and floor levels.
Ceiling systems are presented with similar requirements to masonry construction.
Just as the masonry units must go to the roofline for a gable endwall, in wood-frame
construction, the wall studs must also extend all the way to the top or a ceiling diaphragm
would be required (See Figure V-H).
Roof systems are described in great detail with particular attention paid to truss
framing systems, bracing, roof sheathing, and the roof diaphragm. Trusses are to be
spaced 24 inches on center, and connectors must be installed at truss bearing to resist
uplift loads as specified in a provided table depending upon wind zone, roof and ceiling
load, and building width. See Figures V-I and V-J for typical wood-frame connections.
When a gable endwall extends from the floor to the roof sheathing and is not supported by
a ceiling diaphragm, endwall roof bracing is required to be provided perpendicular to the
rafters or trusses in the first two rafter or truss spaces at each end and must be spaced a
maximum of four feet on center (See Figure V-K). Roof sheathing requirements mirror
those of masonry buildings concerning materials and nailing requirements. Roof
diaphragm requirements are also very similar to masonry structures.
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Chapter 4 - Comb ined Masonry and Wood Exterior Wall Construction
This chapter deals with structures with combined wood frame and masonry wall
elements There are really no specific requirements for this type of building. Instead, the
applicable standards from the previous chapters apply depending upon the building design.
For buildings with masonry on the first floor and wood frame second story, the
foundation and first floor walls must correspond to the requirements for a masonry
structure. Meanwhile, the second story floor system, walls, ceiling, and roof must be in
accordance with the appropriate sections from Chapter 3 on wood-frame construction.
Homes with wood-frame gable endwalls above masonry walls are not permitted
unless there is a ceiling diaphragm as specified in Chapter 2 on masonry construction.
Gable construction must conform to Chapter 3, but connections of walls, ceiling, and
gables must meet standards of Chapter 2.
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EXISTING HURRICANE PREPAREDNESS CONDITIONS OF THREE NAVAL
INSTALLATIONS
Overview
Three large Navy bases in the Jacksonville, Florida area were studied for this
report on hurricane preparedness ofNavy housing. The three bases are Naval Station
Mayport (Mayport), Naval Air Station Jacksonville (NAS Jax), and Naval Submarine
Support Base Kings Bay, Georgia (Kings Bay). The bases of Mayport and Kings Bay are
situated on the coastline while NAS Jax is several miles inland. The Jacksonville area is
obviously susceptible to hurricanes because of its location on the shore, but due to the
indentation of the Atlantic Coast along the Georgia and northeastern Florida shorelines,
this area is less likely to receive a direct hit than most communities in the Carolinas, south
Florida, or along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico.
The existing conditions of the Navy housing on the bases was studied to determine
the overall preparedness of the housing communities on base. Factors that were closely
observed include proximity to the ocean, type of construction (masonry or wood frame),
number of floors, type of unit (single, duplex, modular), wind protection from trees or
other structures, roof systems and endwalls, age of units, garage door configuration, and
exterior opening configuration The housing structures at Mayport and NAS Jax are
similar in that they are single story singles or duplexes with masonry exterior walls and
shallow gable endwalls Those at Kings Bay are generally duplex or modular two-story





Naval Station Mayport is located slightly northeast of downtown Jacksonville,
right on the Atlantic Ocean, and its housing structures are the most susceptible to the wind
and water forces of a hurricane. Mayport has 681 housing units on the base itself with a
few hundred others at nearby locations. For the purpose of this study, only those actually
on the base were considered The housing units at Mayport were built in the early 1960's.
They are all one-story masonry wall structures. Some of the buildings are single units
while most are duplexes.
The housing at Mayport is all in one area approximately half of a mile wide. The
most eastern edge of the housing area is for senior officers and is essentially right on the
beach. There is not a particularly large sand dune to protect from storm surge, but the
units are at least a few feet above the shore elevation. There are some trees, but they are
not of a number or type that would provide significant wind protection for the homes As
expected, the land is very flat
The masonry structures appear to be in reasonably good condition. The walls
themselves are painted with no siding on the walls. There are gable endwalls on nearly all
of the units, and the masonry does not run all the way to the roof line. There is siding
from the top of the masonry walls to the roof line The gables are relatively small due to
the shallow slope of the roofs (typically 2.5:12). The roofs were renovated approximately
ten years ago and are expected to be replaced again in 1 5 years or so with new sheathing,
shingles, and possibly roof trusses.
The duplex units do not have garages, but they do have carports. The single units,
which are closest to the beach, have two-car garages with 18 foot wide garage doors The
homes generally have large window openings with no shutters and no easy way to affix




The most noteworthy deficiencies in terms of hurricane preparedness at Mayport is
the lack of hurricane straps on the roof trusses and diagonal bracing at the endwalls. Even
though the roofs are of very shallow slope, the existence of gable endwalls with no straps,
particularly where the masonry does not go all the way to the roofline, makes the housing
at Mayport very susceptible to severe roof damage and the interior water damage resulting
from the roof failures.
Corrective actions that could be taken include the following:
1
.
Install hurricane straps and diagonal bracing as soon as possible. These actions would
probably reduce the damage caused by a major hurricane by at least one half. It is likely
that a Category III storm or higher would essentially destroy the current roof systems of
nearly every housing unit on the base.
2. Install additional masonry units at the endwalls to the roofline. This could be done
easily at the time of the next roof renovations.
3. Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing, in accordance with SSTD 10-
93, are met at the time of the next roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles rated
for high wind areas are installed.
4. Install anchor positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on
window openings. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the individual
units, and train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane preparedness
briefs Provide public works assistance in the installation process during evacuation
preparations.
5. Install bracing on the garage doors in the single units. Also, perform a study on the
condition of the door tracks and perform the necessary strengthening measures.




Naval Air Station Jacksonville
Naval Air Station Jacksonville is located in the southern portion of Jacksonville,
just north of Interstate 295 and on the western banks of the St Johns River It is
approximately ten miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean, making it less susceptible to wind
damage than Mayport Storm surge itself is not a major concern for NAS Jax, but there is
the potential for flooding from the river. NAS Jax has 3 1 8 permanent family housing units
which were built in the 1970's and are somewhat similar to those at Mayport. The
buildings are masonry wall structures but are mostly single unit structures, unlike
Mayport. The roof systems have wood frame roof trusses with gable endwalls in which
the masonry stops at the ceiling line as opposed to the roof line. Most of the housing is
located in one area which is surrounded by fairly dense woods, thus providing some
degree of protection from the wind but increasing the chance of damage from falling trees
and broken branches.
Most of the housing units at NAS Jax are scheduled for renovation in the coming
year. Several of the improvements are directly related to hurricane preparedness. Of
greatest importance are the modifications to the roof systems. Most of the units will
undergo the replacement of the entire roof systems including trusses, 5/8" plywood
sheathing, and fiberglass shingles. The gable endwalls will remain as they are without
continuous masonry to the roofline The slope of the roof will be 1:2, significantly steeper
than those at Mayport. The new plans call for diagonal bracing for the top chord of the
roof trusses at each gable endwall, but there are no provisions for hurricane straps.
Instead, galvanized metal framing anchors will be utilized to connect the trusses to the top
plate. In addition, vinyl siding will be affixed to the existing masonry exterior walls.
Most of the housing units have carports instead of garages, and those with garages
are only for one car. There are two fairly large window openings in the front of each
house, and other smaller openings on the sides and in the rear. Vinyl shutters are provided
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at each window opening, but the shutters are not large enough to provide protection for
the larger window openings in the front There are typically two single doorways for each
housing unit.
The most pressing deficiency with regard to hurricane preparedness of the housing
facilities at NAS Jax is the lack or hurricane straps. The gable endwalls are also a concern
as are the large windows that cannot be protected by the shutters scheduled for installation
in the coming months. On the whole, considering the inland location of the base, the
housing units at NAS Jax are actually fairly well prepared for a major hurricane.
Corrective actions that could be taken include the following:
1 Install hurricane straps. The existing structures could probably withstand a Category I
and possibly a Category II storm. Depending upon the weakening effect of landfall, a
greater storm would likely destroy the renovated roof systems, as they are currently
designed.
2. Install additional masonry units at the endwalls to the roofline.
3 Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing in accordance with SSTD 10-
93 are met at the time of the upcoming roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles
rated for high wind areas are installed. Modify the contract if the current specifications do
not conform to the Code.
4 Install anchor positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on the
large window openings. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the
individual units, and train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane
preparedness briefs. Provide public works assistance in installation process during
evacuation preparations. This is of low priority, but the small cost of this suggestion
would likely save damage to the interior of the homes.
5. Perform periodic surveys to check the condition of large trees near homes. Cut down
trees showing signs of age that pose the threat of falling on housing units.
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Naval Submarine Support Base Kings Bay. Georgia
Kings Bay is located near the town of St. Mary's, Georgia, approximately 15 miles
north of the Georgia-Florida state line. The base is right on the coastline, but the housing
structures are located in a remote wooded area about 2 miles inland. There are 665 family
housing units at Kings Bay, and they were built in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The
buildings are mostly duplex or 4-plex two-story wood-frame structures. The buildings
typically have large gable endwalls and single car garages attached on the ends for each
housing unit within. The garages also have gable endwalls. There are few trees actually in
the immediate vicinity of the housing units, but the entire area is surrounded by tall, thin
pines which provide some wind protection but also pose a potential threat of falling on the
buildings.
The roof systems are similar to those at the other two bases. There are no
hurricane straps and apparently no diagonal bracing at the top chord of the trusses near
the endwalls However, there is perpendicular bridging between the last three trusses on
each end. The existing shingles are asphalt. From the drawings, it was difficult to
definitively determine whether the exterior wall studs were continuous to the roofline of
the buildings, so a safe assumption is that they do not. The exterior walls are covered by
cedar siding on about half of the structures and brick veneer on the other half.
Most of the windows are fairly small but currently do not have shutters. Shutters
could easily cover all window openings, but approximately half of the windows are
situated very close to downspouts. Each unit has a single door in the front and a sliding
glass door in the rear which leads to a deck or patio.
Once again, Kings Bay's most glaring discrepancy is the roof systems. The roofs
are probably due for renovations in ten years or so, and several modifications could be
made. Protection for the windows and sliding glass doors should also be considered in the
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next renovation, and an assessment of the surrounding trees and the potential damage they
could cause could be beneficial.
One final consideration is the existence of playground facilities located in the
middle of housing sections Playground equipment located in such positions that is not
securely anchored to the ground could cause significant damage to the neighboring
structures.
Corrective actions that could be taken include the following:
1 Install hurricane straps and diagonal bracing when the roof systems are renovated and
as soon as possible. The present roof structures could probably withstand a Category I
and, to some degree, a Category II storm. Depending upon the weakening effect of
landfall, a greater storm would very likely destroy the entire roof systems.
2. Study the feasibility of installing exterior wall studs which extend from the second floor
to the roof line.
3. Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing in accordance with SSTD 10-
93 are met at the time of roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles rated for high
wind areas are installed.
4 Investigate the feasibility of moving the downspouts so that they would not interfere
with shutters that could be installed to provide window protection. Also, install anchor
positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on the sliding glass
doors. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the individual units, and
train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane preparedness briefs.
Provide public works assistance in the installation process during evacuation preparations
5. Perform periodic surveys to check the condition of tall trees near homes. Cut down
trees showing signs of age that pose the threat of falling on housing units.
6 Perform a survey of playground equipment in the housing areas and determine if




LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSTS OF NAVAL INSTALLATIONS
Overview
An important component in a study of a Navy base's hurricane preparedness is to
consider the value of the suggested improvements over the life expectancy of the facilities
in question. In order to do make this study more complete, a life cycle cost analysis of the
housing units at each base must be done. The analysis must determine projected cost
savings if the recommended actions are taken as opposed to if standard replacement of the
existing roof conditions are performed periodically.
Each base was analyzed using rough estimates for the corrective actions listed in
Chapter V. Those per unit costs were projected to be an expenditure in the year 2000.
Periodic repairs, particularly to the roof systems, were projected to take place in 2025,
and for uniformity sake, the life expectancy of the housing facilities at all three bases was
estimated to expire in 2050. Estimated costs of planned roof repairs without the
recommended corrective actions also are necessary for an accurate assessment. The
estimated costs (projected at the time of repairs using a 3% inflation rate) are listed in the
table below:
Estimated Repair Costs (per housing unit)
Base Cost of Repairs per Recommendations Cost of Planned Repairs
Mayport 2000: $15K 2025: $3 IK 2010: $13K 2035: $30K
NASJax 2000: $5K 2025: $31K 2000: $0K 2025: $21K
Kings Bay 2000: $15K 2025: $31K 2010: $13K 2035: $30K
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The next important consideration was to project the likelihood of the various
categories of hurricanes hitting the Jacksonville area in the next 50 years. Using a table
from an article entitled "Engineering the Building Envelope - To Do or Not to Do" from
Hurricanes of 1 992. that predicted the probability and of the various categories of
hurricanes hitting the Miami area in the next 50 years, these values were modified for the
Jacksonville area by reducing the probability to 1/3 of the Miami value. The probabilities
used in this study were as follows:
Hurricane Probability






Each category of hurricane is likely to hit the Jacksonville area no more than one
time in the fifty year period. Years for each of the five hurricane categories were selected
randomly as follows: Category I - 1930, II - 1942, III - 1907, IV - 1948, and V - 1921.
The estimated cost of damages as a result of each category of hurricane at each
base is the final crucial data element in this assessment. Rough estimates were made for
the average damage per housing unit expected for each class of hurricane at each base at
the present value, depending on whether the recommended changes were made or not.
With recommended improvements, potential costs that were considered included
roof and interior repair for Category I and II storms, massive renovation and temporary
resident displacement costs for Category III and IV storms, and total replacement and
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resident displacement costs for Category V storms. Total replacement was based upon a
cost of $75,000 for one unit of housing in the year 2000. Temporary displacement costs
were based upon $200 per day for each housing unit The estimated potential damage
costs with implemented corrective actions at present values (year 2000) are listed below:
Recommended Actions Taken -
Present Value Damage Estimate (2000)/Future Value Damage Estimate
Categorv Year/Multiplier Mayport NAS Jax Kings Bay
I 2030/1.8603 $5K/$12.1K $5K/$12.1K $5K/$12.1K
II 2042/3.4607 $10K/$34.6K $5K/$17.3K $10K/$34.6K
in 2007/1.2299 $50K/$61.5K $25K/$30.7K $45K/$55.3K
IV 2048/4.1323 $85K/$351.2K $45K/$186.0K $80K/$330.6K
V 2021/1.8603 $110K/$204.6K $85K/$158.1K $110K/$204.6K
If no changes are made, considerations would be similar to those for the different
categories of storms. Nearly the same level of damage would be expected in Category IV
and V storms, but they would likely be significantly higher for the smaller storms. The
estimated repair costs per unit if no corrective actions are taken are as follows:
Recommended Actions Not Taken -



























The charts on the following six pages are a graphical representation of the estimated
life cycle costs in the tables on the previous page. Please note conditions concerning
whether corrective actions are implemented or not
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Net Present Value Calculations
In order to determine the net present value per unit for each of the two scenarios
at the three bases, it is necessary to take the sum of the present value of repairs and the
resulting products of the present values of estimated damages for each hurricane type and
their respective probabilities. The following symbols apply:
NPV=Net Present Value
IRC = Initial Repair Costs
PRC = Periodic Repair Costs (at present value)
Pi = Probability of Category i Hurricane Striking
Di = Damage Costs from Category i Hurricane Striking
The resulting equation is as follows:
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 *D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
The Net Present Value calculations for each of the three bases under the two
different scenarios are as follows:
Naval Station Mayport
Recommended Actions Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 15K+15K+(.67*5K)+(.33*10K)+(.1*50K)+(.033*85K)+(.0083*110K)
= 15K + 15K + 3.3K + 3.3K + 5K + 2.8K + 0.9K
- $45.3K
Recommended Actions Not Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 10K+10K+(.67*30K)+(.33*50K)+(.1*85K)+(.033*85K)+(.0083*110K)




Naval Air Station Jacksonville
Recommended Actions Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 5K+15K+(.67*5K)+(.33*5K)+(.1*25K)+(.033*45K)+(.0083*85K)
= 5K + 15K + 3.3K + 1.7K + 2.5K+ 1.5K + 0.7K
= $29.7K
Recommended Actions Not Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 0K+10K+(.67*15K)+(.33*25K)+(.1*45K)+(.033*85K)+(.0083*85K)
= OK + 10K + 10K + 8.3K + 4.5K + 2.8K + 0.7K
- S36.3K
NavaJ Submarine Support Base Kings Bay
Recommended Actions Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 15K+15K+(.67*5K)+(.33*I0K)-K.l*45K)+(.033*80K)+(.0083*1 10K)
= 15K + 15K + 3.3K + 3.3K + 4.5K + 2.6K + 0.9K
= S44.6K
Recommended Actions Not Taken
NPV = IRC + PRC + (P1*D1) + (P2*D2) + (P3 * D3) + (P4 * D4) + (P5 * D5)
= 10K+10K+(.67*25K)+(.33*45K)+(.l*80K)+(.033*80K)+( 0083*1 10K)




Cost Savings of Corrective Actions
Naval Station Mayport
For Mayport, the life cycle cost savings of the corrective actions is $23,400
($68,700 - $45,300) per unit at present value. The total savings based upon 681 housing
units is $1 5,935,400 The total increase in initial and periodic cost of repairs is
$6,810,000 ($10,000 * 681) The present value cost benefit of the recommended
corrective actions for Mayport is $9,125,400.
Naval Air Station Jacksonville
For NAS Jax, the life cycle cost savings of the corrective actions is $6,600
($36,300 - $29,700) per unit at present value. The total savings based upon 318 housing
units is $2,098,800. The total increase in initial and periodic cost of repairs is $3,180,000
($10,000 * 3 18). There is no cost benefit for the recommended corrective actions. The
increase in expenditures is $1,082,200.
Naval Submarine Support Base Kings Bay
For Kings Bay, the life cycle cost savings of the corrective actions is $18,600
($63,200 - $44,600) per unit at present value. The total savings based upon 665 housing
units is $12,369,000. The total increase in initial and periodic cost of repairs is
$6,650,000 ($10,000 * 665). The present value cost benefit of the recommended






This study of recent hurricanes and their effects on housing structures as well as
the cost analysis of the three Jacksonville area Navy bases provides a basis to draw
conclusions and make recommendations for the bases studied as well as all Navy bases
that could be impacted by hurricanes. Specific recommendations for the three bases are
made, and more general recommendations for the present housing structures at other
bases as well as potential new construction are also made.
Specific Recommendations for Studied Naval Installations
The life cycle cost analysis performed on the housing facilities at Mayport, NAS
Jax, and Kings Bay yielded varying results. It is important to remember that the cost
estimates for the proposed corrective actions in Chapter VII are only roughly accurate as
are those estimates for potential recovery costs for different category of hurricanes.
However, the estimates were consistent among the three bases. It is also important to
note that the final cost savings of taking the proposed corrective actions as opposed to not
taking them is largely based on the respective probabilities of the different categories of
storms striking the Jacksonville area Obviously, if a hurricane of great strength did indeed
strike Jacksonville in the next fifty years, the corrective actions would provide tremendous
savings.
Naval Station Mayport
For Mayport, the total present value cost benefit in making the proposed
corrective actions is $9,125,400. Given this significant savings and the location of the
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housing area right on the beach, Mayport should strongly consider pursuing the revisions
much sooner than the roof renovations likely to be performed around 2010 The proposed
corrective actions are reprinted below:
1
.
Install hurricane straps and diagonal bracing as soon as possible These actions would
probably reduce the damage caused by a major hurricane by at least one half. It is likely
that a Category III storm or higher would essentially destroy the current roof systems of
nearly every housing unit on the base.
2. Install additional masonry units at the endwalls to the roofline This could be done
easily at the time of the next roof renovations.
3. Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing, in accordance with SSTD 10-
93, are met at the time of the next roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles rated
for high wind areas are installed.
4. Install anchor positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on
window openings. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the individual
units, and train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane preparedness
briefs. Provide public works assistance in the installation process during evacuation
preparations.
5. Install bracing on the garage doors in the single units. Also, perform a study on the
condition of the door tracks and perform the necessary strengthening measures.
6. Monitor the sand dunes and consider raising the height of the dunes to provide greater
storm surge protection.
Considering a large percentage of the cost of these actions is associated with the




Naval Air Station Jacksonville
According to the analysis in Chapter 6, there is no cost benefit to implementing the
recommended corrective actions. Based upon the probability of hurricanes striking
Jacksonville, the increase in expenditures is predicted to be just more than $ 1 million at
present value. However, if additional funds of approximately $1.5 million are available for
the soon approaching renovations, the housing structures would be much better prepared
for hurricanes, particularly those of Category III strength or less. The recommended
corrective actions for NAS Jax are reprinted below:
1
.
Install hurricane straps. The existing structures could probably withstand a Category I
and possibly a Category II storm. Depending upon the weakening effect of landfall, a
greater storm would likely destroy the renovated roof systems as they are currently
designed.
2. Install additional masonry units at the endwalls to the roofline.
3 Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing in accordance with SSTD 10-
93 are met at the time of the upcoming roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles
rated for high wind areas are installed. Modify the contract if the current specifications do
not conform to the Code.
4. Install anchor positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on the
large window openings. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the
individual units, and train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane
preparedness briefs. Provide public works assistance in installation process during
evacuation preparations. This is of low priority, but the small cost of this suggestion
would likely save damage to the interior of the homes.
5. Perform periodic surveys to check the condition of large trees near homes. Cut down
trees showing signs of age that pose the threat of falling on housing units.
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If funding is available, consideration of a modification to the upcoming contract
should be taken in order to implement the first three items above. The final two
recommended corrective actions could and should be performed quickly at minimal cost
using in-house resources.
Naval Submarine Support Base Kings Bay T Georgia
According to the life cycle cost analysis performed in Chapter VII, Kings Bay
would benefit greatly from the recommended corrective actions. The present value
savings for the housing facilities at Kings Bay if the corrective actions are implemented in
2000 is $5,719,000. Based upon this savings as well as the housing area's close proximity
to the shore, the corrective actions reprinted below should be included at the time of the
next roof renovation, and strong consideration of performing those renovations sooner
than planned should be taken. The recommended corrective actions are as follows:
1 Install hurricane straps and diagonal bracing when the roof systems are renovated and
as soon as possible. The present roof structures could probably withstand a Category I
and, to some degree, a Category II storm. Depending upon the weakening effect of
landfall, a greater storm would very likely destroy the entire roof systems
2. Study the feasibility of installing exterior wall studs which extend from the second floor
to the roof line.
3. Ensure minimum nailing requirements for roof sheathing in accordance with SSTD 10-
93 are met at the time of roof renovations, and ensure composition shingles rated for high
wind areas are installed.
4. Investigate the feasibility of moving the downspouts so that they would not interfere
with shutters that could be installed to provide window protection. Also, install anchor
positions to facilitate the rapid installation of plywood coverings on the sliding glass
doors. Purchase plywood and anchoring devices, store them at the individual units, and
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train the residents in the proper installation at annual hurricane preparedness briefs.
Provide public works assistance in the installation process during evacuation preparations
5. Perform periodic surveys to check the condition of tall trees near homes. Cut down
trees showing signs of age that pose the threat of falling on housing units.
6. Perform a survey of playground equipment in the housing areas and determine if
anchoring is secure to withstand at least Category II winds.
As with the base at Mayport, the first three recommendations comprise the large
majority of the cost increase. Therefore, whether or not the first three items are taken for
action, the final three could and should be implemented as soon as possible using in-house
resources when possible.
General Recommendations for Navy Housing Construction and Renovations
There are several aspects in which the Navy could better ensure a higher level of
hurricane preparedness of family housing. Improved practices in both design and
construction could improve the overall preparedness immeasurably. Most of the following
recommendations would be easy to implement in a short period of time, and several
require very little funding. Instead, paying more attention to certain aspects of design,
construction, as well as planning and maintenance, would go far in reducing the amount of




Conform to SSTD- 10-93 in renovations. The lack of hurricane straps between walls,
floors, and roof systems is the greatest deficiency. In addition, diagonal bracing of the top
truss chord near gable endwalls is not evident, and the gable exterior masonry or studs
stop at the ceiling line instead of extending to the roof. These items should be corrected
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whenever roof renovations are performed on Navy housing in coastal areas The Navy is
not exempt from the Code, and ignorance of the Code appears to be widespread
2. Design housing with more aerodynamic shapes. In particular, hip roof systems are
highly recommended over those with gable endwalls.
3
.
Composition shingles manufactured and rated as satisfactory for high wind areas
should be an essential design component in coastal areas.
4. Include venting with adequate openings to relieve internal pressures on roof systems.
5. Two-car garage doors should be avoided. Wide spans without girts and mullions
generally perform poorly during high winds. In housing renovation designs, consideration
should be given to stabilizing two-car garage doors with girts and mullions.
6. Window design should allow for protection of windows from shutters or precut
plywood.
7 Exterior doors should be designed to withstand the appropriate wind loads.
8 Strong consideration of using masonry construction over wood-frame in potential high
wind areas should be taken. On the whole, masonry structures have performed better than
wood-frame buildings against both heavy winds and storm surge during hurricanes.
9. Modular buildings should be considered a good alternative, but careful attention must
be paid to strengthening the endwalls.
10. Accessory structures such as porch framing, lightpoles, and playground equipment
should be designed to withstand winds greater than the 75 mph currently required. These
items pose a great danger as flying debris.
Construction
1 Improve the quality of construction through strong inspection practices. With the
increasing Navy practice of utilizing the Contractor Quality Control (CQC) program, this
task is less controllable. CQC representatives' experience records should be thoroughly
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checked, and there should be some provision for familiarity with current codes such as
SBCCI's SSTD 10-93 for Hurricane Resistant Residential Construction. Better familiarity
with the code by Resident Officer in Charge of Construction (ROICC) representatives,
particularly with respect to design reviews, would also greatly assist this effort.
2. ROICC representatives should conduct inspections of roof bracing and sheathing prior
to the installation of roof underlayment. Installation of hurricane straps and minimum
nailing requirements for sheathing and shingles should receive particular attention.
3 For tile roof coverings, ROICC representatives should ensure that traffic is not allowed
on the roof for at least 72 hours after installation, and no work should be done on any part





Survey the housing vicinity for trees and other objects that are particularly susceptible
to high winds and which pose a threat to the neighboring homes. Take the appropriate
action to eliminate those threats.
2. Consider installing anchoring devices at window openings for precut plywood
protection. Stage the plywood at the individual homes, and instruct the residents on
installation of the plywood in annual hurricane preparedness briefings.
Conclusions
Navy housing facilities in coastal areas are fairly well prepared for hurricanes, but
steps could be easily taken at minimal cost to ensure an even better posture against the
threats posed by these storms. Overall, the housing studied at the three bases would
probably perform well in a Category I hurricane and possibly a Category II storm, but
hurricanes of greater damage would likely cause significant damage.
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Military housing facilities are very basic and generally provide essential dwelling
needs They are initially built at low costs, and they are expected to last a long time
despite the questionable quality of design and construction, as well as the number of
families which move in and out of a particular unit over many years, none ofwhom regard
the house as a permanent home. In most cases, the existing housing was built to meet
minimum standards. With regard to hurricane preparedness, those standards have
changed in recent years, and the Navy is required to conform to the changing Code
requirements at the time of renovations. Ignorance to the Code requirements and limited
funding are the likely explanations for overlooking items such as hurricane straps and
diagonal bracing during renovations. A strong effort must be made to obtain the
necessary funds to meet the requirements that could save a tremendous amount ofmoney
in the long run.
Taking the actions recommended in this chapter would result in much better
overall hurricane preparedness ofNavy housing facilities. These recommendations will
not prevent all damages during a Category V hurricane, but they could go a long way in
drastically reducing the repair costs and resident displacement time after a Category III or
IV storm. In addition to saving money, this would reduce the family concerns and enable
the base personnel to concentrate on their work-related tasks in an effort to get base fully
operational again.
The recommended actions should be implemented as soon as reasonably possible,
and the idea of accelerating planned renovations, particularly roofs, should be seriously
considered. All of the actions would ultimately serve a great purpose in better protecting
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